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1 Read at the conference of the Dublin Economics Workshop, Kenmare, Co. Kerry, October 18
th. 2009.  
  11. Back to the Future……. 
 
 
For the second time in a generation, Ireland is in a deep fiscal crisis, with double-digit 
borrowing, escalating debt and concerns about the country’s solvency in international 
debt markets, reflected in the largest adverse bond spreads of any Eurozone member. 
What’s different this time is that the fiscal system’s second crisis since the foundation of 
the state has coincided with the banking system’s first. The banks have lost a large 
portion (on worst estimates, all) of their capital and survive on liquidity furnished, on a 
prodigious scale, by the European Central Bank.  
 
Parallels with the first Irish fiscal crisis in the 1980s are of limited value given the quite 
different circumstances. The next section argues that fiscal consolidation post-1987 was 
less daunting than is likely to be the case over the next few years, and that the role of 
expenditure cuts under the first Bord Snip has been exaggerated in journalistic renderings 
of the history of the period. 
 
The deterioration in the public finances has been extraordinarily rapid – even with 
substantial tax rate increases, revenue has fallen far more rapidly than the tax base, while 
spending has continued to advance, despite the widespread perception of cutbacks. The 
conduct of fiscal policy since 2000 is reviewed in section three, and the prospects for a 
medium-term fiscal consolidation in section four. The paper concludes with some lessons 
from Irish experience for politicians - and for economists.  
 






















  22. The 1980s Fiscal Correction and An Cead Bord Snip
2
 
The current fiscal crisis is Ireland’s second, and it is understandable that commentators 
should seek parallels with the first. By 1978, the debt ratio (Exchequer debt to GNP) had 
reached about 65%
3 and economists had begun warning about sustainability. In January 
1980, Taoiseach Charles Haughey made a famous TV broadcast in which he opined that 
‘…we are living beyond our means’. The subsequent development of Exchequer 
borrowing is shown in the chart.   
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Borrowing ran at double-digit rates for over a decade from the mid seventies, and by 
1988, when sustainability was re-attained, the debt/GNP ratio had reached 117%. It is 
worth remembering that various fiscal programmes were prepared in the early 1980s 
which envisaged better macro performance than actually occurred and a more rapid 
return to fiscal balance. What happened in 1988 was planned to happen by 1983 or 1984.  
 
The large deficits from 1980 onwards arose principally from a combination of revenue 
weakness (despite sharp increases in tax rates), expenditure growth in the early years and 
the build-up of debt-service costs. There were three general elections in the 1981-82 
period, and it is interesting to focus on the position in 1987 compared to 1982 under the 
main expenditure and revenue headings. This spans the period in office of the only long-
lived government (the Fine Gael-Labour coalition took office in December 1982) during 
the fiscal crisis after the penny dropped, so to speak. The figures are: 
                                                 
2 If officials give committees titles like the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes, the media can be excused when they dream up snappier alternatives. 
 
3 This is a backward extrapolation on the revised basis adopted from 1982 onwards.   
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                        Table 1: Fiscal Policy over the 1982-1987 Period. 
 
                                                  Cumulative % Change           Average Annual 
 
       Current Services                             40.6                                     7.1 
 
       Central Fund                                   71.6                                   11.4 
 
       Total Current                                  47.3                                     8.1 
 
       Exchequer Capital                        -17.9                                    -3.9 
 
       Total Govt Spending                      36.5                                     6.4 
 
       Total Revenue                                48.7                                     8.3 
 
       Nominal GNP                                46.3                                     7.9 
 
       CPI                                                 35.4                                     6.3 
 




Current non-interest spending rose only a little in real terms, but Central Fund (mainly 








                                                
d
government spending barely exceeded CPI inflation. The lesson is that, if the tax base is
growing only very slowly, as evidenced by sluggish nominal GNP
4, the build-up o
service means you have to cut spending – it is not enough to just hold the line. The 
primary surplus never rose fast enough. The consequence was a fiscal crisis that lasted 
eight years from Mr. Haughey’s dramatic TV broadcast, and a decade from the 
realization, at least in the economics profession, that this was indeed a fiscal crisis. Deb
service absorbed about 30% of tax revenue for ten straight years, total employm
1991 had barely regained the level of a decade earlier and there was net outward 
migration in each year bar one from 1980 to 1991. In total, 221,000 emigrated over this
period, out of a population averaging about 3.5 million versus 4.5 million at April
All of this was accompanied by external imbalance and successive devaluations within 
the European pegged exchange rate system of the time. Honohan and Walsh (2002) 
provide an extended discussion of the attempts to restore fiscal balance during these 
years.  
 
4 I prefer GNP to GDP for fiscal ratios – see appendix. 
  4A minority Fianna Fail government, with Messrs. Haughey and McSharry at the helm
took ov
, 
er in March 1987, and proceeded to establish the first Bord Snip, called the 
xpenditure Review Group, in May 1987. It was led by the secretary of the Department 
e 
 of 
ze on capital spending, a mistake in 
trospect, but most of the adjustment came on the revenue side. The ‘slash and burn’ 
E
of Finance, Sean Cromien, who has recently penned a fascinating account of the episod
as viewed from Merrion St., (Cromien (2009)). A surprising number of myths, none
them the handiwork of the participants, has grown up about the activities and impact of 
this body, of which the author was a member. 
 
Briefly, there was no significant reduction in the real volume of current spending as a 
result of Bord Snip I. There was a further squee
re
stories about 1987, Mac the Knife, decimation of public services and so forth are just 
journalistic invention. It never happened and the hard numbers are in the next table. 
 
 
                         
                        Table 2: The Irish Fiscal Correction 1987 to 1990. 
 
                                                                     1987         1988          1989        1990 
 
   Gross Current Expenditure                         4.3            1.0             0.8           8.5 
 
   Exchequer Capital                                     -9.2        -23.7            -3.0         13.1 
 
   Total Government Expenditure                  2.7          -1.3              0.5           7.0 
 
   CPI                                                             3.1            2.1              4.1           3.3 
 
   Gross Exchequer Current Revenue            8.2           7.6               1.0           8.9 
 




Debt service costs changed little over these years (interest rates had fallen, offsetting the 
sing debt volume), so the figures for total current spending and for non-interest 




in 1988, fell a little faster in 1989, but rose quite rapidly in 1990. By 1990, the real 
volume of current spending, however measured, was comfortably above the 1987 
The big contributors to the adjustment were the severe cuts in capital spending and the 
sharp improvement in revenue.  
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                                  Table 3: Real GNP Growth in the 1980s 
 
    1980    1981    1982    1983    1984    1985    1986    1987    1988   1989    1990 
 




In 1986, the volume of GNP was about the same as it had been in 1980. It then grew 
7.6% to 1990, an annual average real growth rate of 4.1%. A contributory factor was a 
ell-executed devaluation in August 1986. The tax amnesty introduced in the January 
 
e 
yourself into a position to get 
cky. The capital cuts, in retrospect, were overdone during the 1980s, tax rates were 
lt 
l 
current position is 
ecidedly less favourable in that regard: the deterioration has been sudden, and has 
s one 
ironment, which was not the case 
 1987. 
     
1
w
1988 budget also contributed, yielding at least 2% of GNP more than expected. It was
one of the most successful tax amnesties anywhere at the time, and attracted attention 
from policymakers internationally (Uchitelle (1989)). 
 
The first Bord Snip contributed no doubt, but more in the sense of the old football adag
that ‘….you make your own luck’, in other words, get 
lu
raised to self-defeating levels and the emerging fiscal crisis could, and should, have been 
addressed much earlier. In my view, if it had been acknowledged in say 1978 and dea
with decisively, it could have been over by about 1982 or 1983.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the public did not need persuading that there was indeed a fisca
crisis: the topic had dominated political debate for a decade. The 
d
coincided both with a domestically-generated banking collapse and a deep international 
recession. Public acceptance of the need for severe spending adjustments has been 
weakened by the infantilisation of public debate through the bubble period by both 
government and opposition. A further difference from 1987 is the markedly less 
forgiving condition of the international sovereign debt markets, in which Ireland wa
of the few heavy borrowers at times during the 1980s. 
 
On the plus side, the extraordinary pace of spending increases in the last decade means 
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3. Fiscal Policy since 2000  
rom a position of fiscal balance and a declining debt ratio that had lasted over a decade, 
s this year lurched into heavy deficit, and the debt ratio has 
egun to rise rapidly. On the GGB definition, gross debt will have more than doubled as 
 
F
the public finance position ha
b
% GDP in just two years by end 2009. The table shows developments in some public 
finance aggregates since the turn of the century. 
 
 
                       
                     Table 4: Trends in Spending, Deficit and Debt, 2000 to 2009. 
 
                                   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009f   
 
Tot Spend % Chg*      10.4   16.1    11.0      7.7      6.2     11.1    10.6   11.5      9.8       7.1 
 
Current - CF % Chg    11.4   19.7    14.8      9.2      7.7     10.3    10.6    12.1     9.9       6.0  
 
CPI % Chg                    5.6     4.9      4.6      3.5      2.2       2.5      4.0      4.9      4.1     -4.4 
 
Total as % GNP          34.7   36.7    37.5    36.6    36.2     37.0     36.8   38.8    44.5    51.1 
 
GGB Deficit**             4.7     0.9     -0.4      0.4      1.4       1.7       3.0     0.2    -7.3   -12.0 
 
GGB Debt**              37.8   35.6     32.2    31.0     29.4    27.5     25.0   25.1   44.2     59.0 
 
*Total = gross current + Exchequer capital + Central Fund (CF). 




The recent sharp deterioration in both deficit and debt ratios is of course driven in part by 
e unprecedented decline in GDP. On any measure, spending grew rapidly from 2000 






future so to speak, through building for stock. Spend relative to GNP as measured was 
growing up to 2007, and even more so if the GNP growth rates and hence tax buoyancy
from say 2002 onwards were in truth not as good as they looked. The dramatic increase 
in spending ratios in the last couple of years has a large cyclical component, but it is 
salutary to note that the real increase in current spending in 2009, excluding debt service,
will likely be in double digits. This continuing expenditure growth has of course been 
accompanied by a collapse in tax revenue exceeding the decline in the tax base, reflec








The Origins of the Irish Bubble – an Urtext 
 
Since the Lansdowne Road stadium closed for reconstruction at the end of 2006, all 
rugby, soccer, Gaelic football and hurling games in Dublin have been played at Croke 
Park. This is what statisticians call a hypothesis test: is it possible to accommodate all 
major games in a single Dublin stadium? The answer apparently is yes. When Lansdowne 
Road re-opens next year, the two stadiums will share the available fixtures and both will 
be under-utilised QED.  
 
It is salutary to note that (i) both Croke Park and Lansdowne Road have received 
substantial Exchequer support, and (ii) at one stage, there were live plans to have four 
modern stadiums in Dublin. The third would have been Eircom Park, promoted by the 
Football Association of Ireland and promised public funds. It fell through. The most 
ambitious was the National Stadium at Abbotstown, promoted by the Department of the 
Taoiseach and better known as the Bertiebowl. When finally killed off by Progressive 
Democrat Ministers Mary Harney and Michael McDowell, the cost estimate had reached 
€1 billion.  
 
The National Stadium fiasco should stand as the definitive monument to the retreat from 
reality in Ireland during the early stages of the Bubble. While it appears ridiculous now, 
the project was taken seriously by the political class and the media for the best part of a 
decade. It is entirely fair to note that the project enjoyed the endorsement of an economic 
and technical evaluation from an impressive list of consultants (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Indecon and numerous others (1999)). Their findings included 
 
‘Progressive countries and economies have certain landmark buildings such as sports 
stadia to accommodate and showcase what is best about that society. Investments in such 
flagship projects are made primarily on strategic grounds, and rarely on financial or 
economic grounds alone. 
 
Ireland is entering the 21
st. century as a confident, young and dynamic country, achieving 
international recognition for our achievements on many fronts – our economic recovery, 
our cultural and artistic renaissance, and not least our sporting achievements. The 
National Sports Stadium Complex would be an icon for Ireland and Irishness.’  
 
The report is dated 22
nd. October 1999, a decade ago almost to the day. This document 
deserves a place as an Urtext of the Irish Bubble.  
 




  8The recent economic history of Ireland can be divided provisionally into the fiscal 
onsolidation phase up to the currency crisis of late 1992 and early1993; the Celtic Tiger 






mid-2007. The Irish Bubble has been, in relative terms, one of the largest in a devel
country and seems destined to spawn a cottage industry for economic analysts to rival 
that created by the Tiger. The main domestic components were failures in expenditure 
control and in the regulation and supervision of the banking system. Of course even if 
Irish policy had been flawless in both of these dimensions, the economy would now be 
experiencing a serious downturn, but it is a form of denial, and not conducive to the bes
policy response, to pretend that the current crisis was caused by an asteroid strike, or th
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4. Fiscal Consolidation over the Medium Term 
he recent revised programme for government reiterates the commitment to the fiscal 
plementary budget last April. These 
re   
 
T




                    Table 5: Government’s Fiscal Consolidation Programme 
 
                                                      2009        2010        2011        2012        2013 
 
     GGB Deficit % GDP              12.00       10.75         8.50         5.50         3.00  
 
     GGB Debt % GDP                      59            73            78            79            77           
 
     Assumed GDP Growth            -7.7          -2.9         +2.7         +4.2         +4.0 
    
 
 
In April, the GGB deficit for this year was expected to be 10.75% of GDP. Due mainly to 
x revenue weakness, this now looks unlikely, and 12% is more realistic. The GGB debt, 
own at 59% in the April document, will presumably be a few points higher, as would 
 base 
re-affirmation of the fiscal consolidation programme, 
o doubt it has, but more importantly it has been permitted by the European 
ar as I am aware, has been 




the figures for subsequent years. The GDP decline shown for 2010 is pessimistic 
compared to more recent forecasts, but the numbers pencilled in for 2011, 2012 and 2013 
are ones a lot of people would settle for. The adjustment, crucially, is expected to come 
substantially on the revenue side. Tax revenue is assumed to rise 27% from a 2009
now unlikely to be reached. The figures also assume that spending grows very little, 
despite the inevitable build-up of debt service costs, implying significant real cuts in the 
non-interest component. These are forecasts, and debating their plausibility is pointless. 
What matters is the target deficit for 2013, at the SGP limit of 3%. The Stability and 
Growth Pact has been relaxed but not abandoned, and Eurozone members are still 
expected, when the dust settles, to (i) not breach the 3% limit, but also (ii) adhere to the 
0% average over the cycle.    
 
The revised government programme agreed between Fianna Fail and the Greens last 
weekend states, regarding the 
 
‘This plan has been welcomed by the European Commission’. 
 
N
Commission, and as a concession – no other member state, so f
g
Trade Unions, who argue for a much longer period of adjustment are in effect
that we should go back to the Commission and re-negotiate the terms of our adherence to 
Eurozone rules. There can be no presumption that such a re-negotiation would succeed. 
  10Nor is it self-evidently in Ireland’s interests to spin out the adjustment to 2017 or 2018,
were it to be permitted by the Commission, and by the international sovereign lenders. 












l and will reverse 
nyway as the economy recovers, but it must be accepted that some of the increases 
anced 
 to persuade 
d to switch resources 
                                                
adjustment.
5 An important difference between the current situation and the 1980s is that 
worldwide sovereign debt issuance is at unprecedented levels and the markets, though 
improving, remain stretched. As quantitative easing programmes are withdrawn, th
issuance which they have been supporting will also have to be trimmed, so the European 
Central Bank’s stance will affect Ireland’s options. Finally Ireland’s credit spread at ten
years against the bund remains around 160 basis points, easily the largest adverse spread 
of any Eurozone member. Bluntly, this means that the markets are not convinced that 
Irish debt is free of risk, and countries with higher debt ratios than ours, and no greater 
liquidity, enjoy narrower spreads. Any move to delay the fiscal adjustment could see 
spreads widen further, adding quickly to debt-service costs and thus offsetting at least 
part the intended relaxation of fiscal policy. Some of those advocating stimulus or a 
slower adjustment are assuming an elastic supply of sovereign credit at unchanged cos
as well as low fiscal leakages, neither of which is self-evidently realistic.  
 
Fiscal consolidation must be seen in the broader policy context. In addition to fixing the 
budget, we need to fix the banking system, cut wage and non-wage costs to
c
ESRI/Foundation for Fiscal Studies conference during the week, the Central Bank 
Governor suggested that a reasonable medium-term target would be to re-balance th
economy with revenue and expenditure shares in GNP around the levels prevailin
or ten years ago (Honohan (2009)). This would mean a sharp increase in the ratio o
revenue to GNP from current very depressed levels. Rates of tax have already been 
increased and there may be further increases on the way, but the tax/GNP ratio should 
rise anyway without rate increases. People will have to replace cars eventually, for 
example, and the rise in the savings ratio cannot go on forever.  
 
But the Governor’s suggestion also implies that the recent sharp increase in the ratio
public spending to GNP should be reversed. Some of it is cyclica
a
during the Bubble were based on a misperception of the economy’s long-run taxpaying 
capacity. What must be avoided is any nostalgia, in any area of policy, for the unbal
economy which emerged in the final years of the Bubble. In 2007, we had full 
employment, easy credit and a balanced budget, but we also had iffy banks, excess 
leverage throughout the system, crowding-out of the traded sector and poor 
competitiveness. It felt fine, but it was not a good place to be.  
 
A re-balanced economy will not look like 2007, unless we somehow manage
foreigners to finance another Bubble. At its simplest, it will nee
 
5 The net debt has recently been about 20 GDP points below the gross figure it is true (the state has 
financial assets, mainly cash arising from pre-funding by the NTMA and the securities held by the National 
Pension Reserve Fund). But the gross debt figure contains no provision for any Exchequer costs which 
might emerge from the bank rescue, which works the other way.   
 
  11from making buildings and other non-tradables to making exports. It is clear from the 
table that the shrinking of the construction sector continues apace, with employment  
 
 
     
              Table 6: Sectoral Employment Trends (seasonally adjusted). 
 
                Tot Emp  Construction   ‘Public’ Emp   ‘Private’ Emp   Public as % Private 
 
Q1 04        1838.3          190.2                380.3               1458.0                     26.1 
Q2 04        1856.6          199.0                386.4               1470.2                     26.3    
Q3 04        1885.0          210.3                390.9               1494.1                     26.2 
Q4 04        1901.9          211.9                390.3               1511.6                     25.8 
          
Q1 05        1927.8          225.1                399.6               1528.2                     26.1 
Q2 05        1949.3          229.0                408.4               1540.9                     26.5 
Q3 05        1976.1          231.2                413.6               1562.5                     26.5 
Q4 05        1996.8          238.0                421.2               1575.6                     26.7 
 
Q1 06        2021.2          247.1                430.8               1590.4                     27.1 
Q2 06        2039.9          253.5                437.5               1602.4                     27.3 
Q3 06        2053.8          265.8                445.7               1608.1                     28.3 
Q4 06        2076.8          266.9                447.9               1628.9                     27.5 
 
Q1 07        2102.0          269.2                452.6               1649.4                     27.4 
Q2 07        2119.6          272.8                452.7               1666.9                     27.2 
Q3 07        2131.3          265.4                462.3               1669.0                     27.7 
Q4 07        2136.4          261.2                461.4               1675.0                     27.5 
 
Q1 08        2139.5          254.1                462.9               1676.6                     27.6 
Q2 08        2119.1          244.7                468.7               1650.4                     28.4 
Q3 08        2088.8          230.0                471.1               1617.7                     29.1 
Q4 08        2050.4          213.4                484.2               1566.2                     30.9 
 
Q1 09        1981.2          181.5                479.7               1501.5                     31.9 
Q2 09        1944.9          158.0                484.8               1460.1                     33.2 
 
Chg % v 
   Peak           -9.1          -42.1                    0.0                  -12.9                       0.0 
 
Source: Table 3, QNHS for Q2 2009, www.cso.ie. 
 
Public: NACE O (Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security), P 
(Education), and Q (Human Health and Social Work). Private: Total - OPQ. 
 
  12down 42% from peak. But the three sectors called O, P and Q (public administration, 
education and health) have yet to peak in employment terms, and these are hardly 
romising export sectors.  
blic 
ourse are paid out of budgets which enjoy public subvention. 
ed 





The three sectors OPQ exceed in aggregate by a fair margin the total number of pu
service employees, reflecting the presence of workers in health and education who are not 
blic servants. Many of c pu
Employment in the OPQ sector has yet to peak, and the % of total employment account
for by these three employment categories has risen from around 26% a few years ago to 
33% in mid-2009. We need to re-balance more than the public finances. 
 
The 1987-90 fiscal consolidation finally took place in a more propitious environment 
than seems likely over the next four or five years: GNP growth rates will do well to 
a
cannot have another last-chance tax amnesty. The other important difference is that the
years preceding the 1987 corrective action were ones in which current and capital 
spending had grown very little – this time, we are faced for the first time with a fiscal 
correction coming out of a bubble. There was a bubble in public spending as well as in 
credit provision, and the economy will not be re-balanced on a sustainable path unl
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5. Lessons from the 1980s for Politicians (and Economists) 
he principal lesson for policymakers is that little was achieved by delaying the fiscal 
ould have been justified 
ven earlier, the economy could have skipped five miserable years. Four more specific 
acro projection on which it is based. Better be cautious, and be surprised on 
the upside! 
(ii) 
os in a downturn. 
   
 are 
ot enough just to halt the rise in real non-
interest spending. 
 
(iv)  lp if 
could be undertaken by someone other than consultants 
hired by the project promoters. I cannot recall a single project being dropped 
 
There are s
implosion  ings were issued 





he ball after stoppages in play. Christy was 
ccused of gamesmanship, taking quick frees, even of swapping a soggy ball on a wet 
 
T
adjustment. Had action been taken from as late as 1980, and it w
e
lessons are   
 
(i)  A medium-term consolidation is more likely to under-achieve, the rosier the 
m
 
Even with rising tax rates, it is difficult to realise substantial increases in 
tax/GNP rati
(iii)  With debt-service building up, and pressure on social transfers, actual cuts
needed for stabilisation – it is n
The better capital projects need to be identified and defended. It would he
project evaluation 
as a result of an evaluation conducted in this manner.   
ome lessons for economists too. While the full dimensions of the Irish 
were foreseen by no-one, it is simply untrue that no warn
a
matter, although what is heard matters more than what is said. The IMF reports on
Ireland from the early years of the current decade make interesting reading, especially
banking and credit developments. On the lack of discipline in expenditure control see 
Lawlor and McCarthy (2003). But it seems obvious that, after the abolition of the 
currency in 1999, many Irish economists began to focus more on micro-policy concerns, 
believing that the big macro issues including external financial balance and budgetary 
policy (given the Stability and Growth Pact rules) had been taken off the list of thi
likely to go wrong. This was a bad call!  
 
The legendary hurler Christy Ring was noted for taking advantage of the inattention of
Cork’s opponents when the referee held t
a
day for a crisp dry one secreted on his person. Asked about this after he retired, Ring 
remarked:  
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Appendix: Choice of Denominator for Fiscal Ratios 
 is conventional internationally to express fiscal ratios (tax or total government revenue, 
sures) as a percentage of GDP, a 
eographical output concept. GDP answers the question ‘how much output is produced 
 
me). They are related as follows: 
NP plus/minus other current payments abroad (eg EU taxes/subsidies) = GNI;  
NI plus/minus other international transfers (foreign aid, emigrants’ remittances, net EU 
 net creditor/debtor position, small foreign sector, will have GDP 
ughly = GNP roughly = GNI, and if it is not a big aid giver or receiver, and has small 
’ 
g recently. So income is less than 
utput and the choice of denominator matters. 
ble. 
s are in a range of a few points either side 
f 100, with just four out of twenty below 96. Just two, Luxembourg and Ireland, are 
 
It
current or total expenditure, various debt and deficit mea
g
annually in China’? The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact explicitly employs GDP as the 
denominator for debt and deficit ratios, and organisations such as the IMF and OECD 
routinely make international comparisons, and do fiscal policy analysis, with GDP as the
denominator.  
 
The alternatives are GNP, GNI (gross national income), or GNDI (gross national 
disposable inco
 





transfers) = GNDI. 
 
There are many countries where the differences between these aggregates are minor. A 
country with a small
ro
migrants’ remittances, GNDI will be similar too. 
 
Ireland is not such a country. Factor payments abroad are substantial and both emigrants
remittances and outward aid flows have been risin
o
 
Some figures for the ratio of GNI to GDP for European countries are shown in the ta
The Euro-area average is 99.3%. Most countrie
o
below 90. In both cases, there are substantial annual net outflows in the form of factor 
payments, mainly returns on foreign capital. At least for comparative purposes across 
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    Table 7: Ratios of Gross National Income to Gross Domestic Product, 2008. 
 
   Austria            98.4            Hungary             93.3           Slovenia                      97.7 
 
   Belgium        100.4            Ireland              85.8            Spain                          97.3 
 
   Czech Rep      92.5             Italy                   98.5            Sweden                    102.2 
 
   Denmark       101.8            Luxembourg      75.5            United Kingdom      102.1 
 
   Finland           99.8             Netherlands       97.4 
   
   France          100.7             Poland (2007)    96.4            Euro Area                  99.3 
 
   Germany      101.7             Portugal             96.0 
 




It also matters when looking at long time-series, since the relationship between the 
ompeting denominators has been shifting. Up to the mid-1970s, GNP and GDP were 




up to the mid-1990s. It has recently fluctuated about 85%. Recent trends in the inco
measures, as a % of GDP, are shown in the next table. 
 
 
                
                   Table 8: Alternative Income Measures as % of GDP, Ireland.  
 
                  1995 ¦   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008 
 
GNP           88.4     85.2    83.8     81.8    84.5    84.7    84.6   86.3    85.0    85.0 
 
GNI            90.2     86.2    84.5     83.0    85.5    85.6    85.8   87.0    85.6    85.8  
 
GNDI         91.1     86.1    83.9     82.4    84.8    84.9    84.8   86.0    84.5    84.4 
      
 
 
All three ratios fell sharply from 1995 to 2000, oscillated to 2006 and have slipped again 
 the last couple of years.   in
 
  16In the context of assessing fiscal policy, and in particular of the credibility of fiscal 
consolidation programmes, the critical issue is taxable capacity. The best denominator for 
scal ratios, in this view, is the one closest to the tax base. Interestingly, member states 
009) 
. I 
 these arguments because all income produced in Ireland is eligible for 
xation by the Irish government.’  
orporate profits much of which are ultimately 







pay contributions to the EU budget based on GNI, although the EU uses the output 
measure GDP for fiscal ratios under the Stability and Growth Pact. This when it comes to 
levying the Eu’s ‘tax’ on members, GDP is abandoned.  In supporting a contention that 
Irish public spending has been low compared to European averages, Karl Whelan (2
favours GDP as the fiscal denominator. Noting that not everyone agrees, he states (in 
footnote 8): 
 




Output produced in Ireland does not translate into income available to Irish taxable 
entities though. A portion of GDP (c
e
taxed at this rate), but most tax revenue comes from income, payroll and expenditure
taxes. These are probably best proxied by GNDI. If a choice has to be made betwee
GNP and GDP, GNP is far closer to GNDI. Whelan’s point that   ‘….all income 
produced in Ireland is eligible for taxation by the Irish government’ is true but not 
operationally significant: the excess of GDP over GNP is taxed only a little, and it is n
clear that an increase in the rate of tax (on currently expatriated corporate profits)
yield extra revenue. Of course, the best way to do taxable-capacity analysis is throu
fully articulated model of tax revenues, and the ESRI model embeds a detailed revenue 
specification. Fiscal ratios are shorthand at best.    
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